BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG (DAY 2)
as told by GFS JIM/James L. Walker in
the American Civil War History chat (on AOL)
Early on the morning of July 2nd, 1863, Lee met with General James Longstreet
who continued to press for a wide swing around the enemy's left. But Lee,
concerned about the absence of J.E.B. Stuart's Cavalry, refuted Longstreet's
suggestion. A.P. Hill and Henry Heth shortly joined the two, and immediately
thereafter, Major Gen. John Bell Hood arrived on the scene. Close behind Hood
was Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws' division. Still to arrive was the division
under Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett. It was very apparent to the newly arrived
commanders that things were not well between Longstreet and Lee. About this
time, Confederate scouts returning to camp, reported that Federal pickets were
stationed at the southern portion of Cemetery Ridge and that the Round Tops
were unmanned. Lee ordered Longstreet to march his two divisions south and
advance them along the Emmitsburg Road to the northeast, toward Cemetery Ridge.
After overtaking the Federal left, he would attack Cemetery Hill from the
south. Meanwhile, A.P. Hill, with the divisions of Major Generals Anderson and
Pender, would attack from the west. It was to be a group assault with each
Brigade moving in behind the other and striking back to back. Meanwhile,
Ewell's Corps in Gettysburg was facing Federal positions to the south. If the
opportunity presented itself, he was to make a full scale assault on Cemetery
Hill and Culp's Hill. At about 10 a.m., Lee ordered Longstreet off to carry out
his attack plans. But after a while, when he didn't hear any skirmishing taking
place, Lee became concerned. Added to his obvious impatience with his leading
General, was Lee's physical ailment. It is now believed that he was suffering
severe pain and discomfort from the progressing heart disease that would take
his life only two years after the war's end. When he finally communicated with
Longstreet, he discovered that Longstreet had not wanted to begin his march
until Law's Brigade had arrived as his back-up.
Shortly after Longstreet began his advancing march, J.E.B. Stuart finally
showed up in camp. He and his men had been on a foray that began on June 25th.
Instead of doing the prudent thing and riding back westward to keep in touch
with Lee, he chose to ride around Hancock's Federal Corps. In doing so, he
placed himself in a precarious position of being unable to communicate with
Lee's right flank. Continuing on his trek, he decided to pursue and capture a
Federal Wagon Train which he would offer to Lee when he finally showed up at
Gettysburg on the 2nd. Lee's initial response at the site of his long lost
Cavalry Commander was that of anger. Yet, almost as quickly as the anger had
set in, it was gone and Lee asked Stuart for his help remarking: "We shall not
discuss this matter further."
Meanwhile, Longstreet was marching west on the Chambersburg Pike, turning off
on a side road and heading towards Black Horse Tavern on the Hagerstown Road.
At the same time, Brig. General Joseph B. Kershaw, leading McLaws' Brigade,
marched east toward the Emmittsburg Road. When he came to Herr's Ridge, he
realized he could not advance any farther without being seen by the enemy and
when Longstreet realized this, he ordered his whole force back, continuing them
toward the Chambersburg Pike, and down another route along Willoughby Run. This
delay cost him two very valuable hours. It wasn't until approximately 3:30
p.m., that his Corps began falling into place west of the Emmitsburg Road.
Hood's Division was on the right facing the Round Tops and McLaws' on the left
opposite Cemetery Ridge. The overwhelming number of Federal troops that McLaws
found in front of him were men from Gen. Daniel Sickles' III Corps.
George Gordon Meade was a graduate of West Point and had served as an Army
Engineer in the Mexican War. On June 28th, just days before the historic events
at Gettysburg, he was placed in charge of the Army. When he attempted to
refuse, he was informed that it was an order, not a request. Now, at
Gettysburg, he appeared "careworn and tired."
Through the night and early morning of the 2nd, Federal troops, totaling
approximately 95,000, came marching into the small hamlet. By 9 a.m., most of
the Army of the Potomac had been deployed in the irregular shape of a
horseshoe. The right consisted of Slocum's XII Corps which held a line along
the rocky slope that extended southeast from Culp's Hill along Rock Creek. The
curve of the horseshoe was covered by Wadsworth's battle-worn I Corps on Culp's
Hill and Howard's XI Corps on Cemetery Hill. At Cemetery Hill, the line bent
south, with Hancock's II Corps extending down Cemetery Ridge. Sickles' III
Corps was ordered to position itself beyond Hancock on the extreme Federal
left. The V Corps under Maj. General George Sykes was placed in reserve on the
Baltimore Pike behind Cemetery Hill. Still to arrive was Maj. General John
Sedgwick's VI Corps.
Unbeknownst to Meade, on the morning of July 2nd, the every important Round
Tops were undefended. The night before, the bulk of General John W. Geary's
division of the XII Corps had been ordered to move south on Cemetery Ridge. Two
of his regiments had spent the night on Little Round Top but were ordered off
to Culp's Hill the morning of the 2nd. He was supposed to be relieved on
Cemetery Ridge by Sickles' III Corps. Geary was quite aware of the strategic
importance of Little Round Top. Before he left, he sent two separate notes to
Sickles explaining the necessity of manning that position. Sickles ignored them
both. Unable to wait any longer, Geary left and Little Round Top was left
unmanned...a fact soon reported to General Lee. Sickles instead decided to
place his troops a half mile north of the Round Tops. He believed that the high
ground, which consisted of a Peach Orchard and situated about a half-mile to
the west was more of a threat, especially if the enemy were to set their guns
there. In an attempt to locate any Confederate troops in the area of Pitzer's
Woods, he sent out skirmishers... four companies of the lst U.S. Sharpshooter's
under Col. Hiram Berdan. Across the Emmitsburg Road, they ran into Confederate
skirmishers. After a brief fight, Berdan withdrew and reported to Sickles that
the woods were indeed full of Rebels. In reality, there were only three
regiments of General Cadmus Wilcox's Alabama brigade, the far right of Hill's
Corps.
Sickles decided to advance toward the Emmitsburg Road and at 3 p.m., the III
Corps pushed forward toward the Peach Orchard and the woods. Meade was unaware
of any such advance and when he heard the sound of gunfire, he instructed
General Sykes and his V Corps up from the Baltimore Pike in support of Sickles.
The VI Corps would then move up into Sykes' position. Riding out on the field
with Brig. General Gouveneur K. Warren, Meade saw first hand the horrific
scene: The right flank consisting of the divisions of Brig. Generals Andrew A.
Humphreys and David B. Birney were totally exposed. Meade's anger at Sickles'
poor deployment would have to wait and he made a mental note to deal with his
commander at a later time.
If tensions were high between the Union commanders, things weren't much
different between the Confederates. Upon realizing his plan of advancement was
thwarted by Sickles' Corps, McLaws immediately sent word several times to
Longstreet about his plight. Longstreet's only reply was that when the time
came, he (McLaws) must attack...no matter what
At the same time, Hood on the far right, was undergoing similar problems. From
his position in Pitzer's Woods, Hood could see Birney's Troops, supported by a
second Georgia Brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson. U. S.
Sharpshooters on the lower slope of Big Round Top opened fire on the 15th
Alabama, stationed on the far right of Law's line. In an attempt to clean them
out, the 15th and 47th Alabama charged up the hill. It was a tough struggle up
the craggy and thickly wooded slopes of the hill but eventually, with the enemy
retreating, the Alabama troops set foot on the top of Big Round Top. No sooner
had he gotten to the top than Colonel William B. Oates was told that Gen. Hood
had been wounded and that Law was now in command. Law's first order was for
Oates to leave his hard-won spot on Big Round Top and take Little Round Top.
On his way back down the hill, Oates was joined by the 4th Alabama and the 4th
and 5th Texas who had been skirmishing around Devil's Den and the western base
of Big Round Top. Not seeing any Union troops, they made their way across to
the base of Little Round Top and began to ascend the hill. Suddenly from behind
the rocks in front of them came an overwhelming fire.
In reality, the Federals had only minutes before fallen into place. Had it not
been for the sound wisdom of Gen. Warren, who had found Little Round Top
unmanned and requested troops be moved forward, the hill would have belonged to
the Confederates. In support, General Sykes sent portions of his V Corps to
assist in holding the hill. Brig. General James Barnes was ordered to send a
brigade to assist, but when Barnes could not be found, Colonel Strong Vincent,
commanding the lead brigade stepped forward and responded to the request for
deployment to Little Round Top. The last of Vincent's Regiments to climb the
hill was the 20th Maine. Addressing its Commander, Colonel Joshua Lawrence
Chamberlain, Vincent made it clear that the 20th Maine was the extreme left of
the Union line. "You understand. You are to hold this ground at all costs."
Within minutes of these men arriving on the hill, Oates and his Confederates
began their assault. Hiding behind the natural rocks, Chamberlain's troops
methodically rose and fired...sending the Confederates reeling back. Undaunted,
they charged again and again, only to be repulsed again and again. For an hour
and a half, the battle waged on. When Chamberlain realized that his men were
down to their last cartridges, he ordered them to fix bayonets and charge
before the Rebels had a change to regroup. Down the hill they came, yelling and
screaming, brandishing their bayonets and taking the Rebels totally by
surprise. Although the 20th Maine had lost 130 of its 386 men during the
assault, it had won a very important battle. They had retained control of
Little Round Top and had captured many Confederate prisoners to boot.
On the far right, Vincent's Brigade wasn't so lucky. The 16th Michigan was
falling apart under the severe attack of the 4th and 5th Texas. While trying to
rally his men, Colonel Vincent had been mortally wounded and all seemed lost.
But, thanks once more to Gen. Warren, who came to the rescue with
reinforcements, the day was saved. Standing on the top of Little Round Top, one
could see the savage fighting going on in Devil's Den and Plum Run Valley,
which for obvious reasons would be renamed "The Valley of Death." Stationed on
a ridge nearby were regiments from New York, Pennsylvania, Maine and Indiana as
well as artillery guns from the 4th New York Battery. It had been a shell from
one of these guns that had shattered Hood's arm.
Confederate troops from Texas and Arkansas stormed into Devil's Den and the
Valley of Death and were immediately picked off by Union troops on Little Round
Top. Rebel soldiers were in the meantime, involved in a desperate struggle to
unman the guns above Devil's Den. The battle swayed back and forth and
eventually, the Confederates overtook the ground and captured three of the
Union's guns. During this time, the struggle at the Peach Orchard with Birney's
line continued.
At about 5:30 p.m., Longstreet allowed McLaws' division to move up and assist
Anderson in his assault on the Federal line at the Wheatfield. Also assisting
were several regiments from Kershaw's Brigade and a George Brigade under the
command of Paul J. Semmes, brother of Raphael Semmes. The Federals stood long
and hard at the Wheatfield, but when Brig. General James Barnes mistakenly
ordered a withdrawal, he ended up leaving a large gap in the Union line. This
forced the rest of the Union troops in the Wheatfield to pull back. More
Federal units came up to take their place and the battle for control of the
Wheatfield went back and forth, with the battlefield changing hands several
times. Finally, when a fresh V Corps division moved in, they were able to
restore Birney's line between the Wheatfield and the Devil's Den.
Meanwhile the Peach Orchard had been under severe attack from the men of
Mississippi, commanded by Gen. William Barksdale. With 1600 men, Barksdale had
managed to push through the Federal line and force the Yankees to retreat.
During the Peach Orchard battle, General Sickles received his now famous wound.
He had been on horseback near the Trostle farm when a solid shot hit his right
leg, totally destroying it from the knee down. The leg was later amputated and
he would outlive most of the commanders from both North and South.
With the III Corps line broken, the remainder of the Federal lines became
vulnerable and so Meade ordered reinforcements to move up. To Little Round Top,
he sent two V Corps Brigades. From Culp's Hill came the bulk of the XII Corps.
As well, Abner Doubleday's and John Robinson's Brigades of the I Corps came
along with Sedgwick's VI Corps. Hancock remained at Cemetery Ridge with the II
Corps. At the Trostle Farm, Union Batteries appeared to be in danger of being
overrun by Barksdale's men, who had continued on their assault from the Peach
Orchard. Lt. Colonel Freeman McGilvery of Maine was instrumental in getting the
9th Massachusetts Battery in place to hold this line against the Confederates
until reinforcements could arrive. Help came from the XII Corps and struck the
center of Barksdale's Brigade forcing them back.
In the North, at Cemetery Ridge, a gap had occurred when one of the Divisions
had moved off to the Wheatfield. Now, Wilcox's Confederate Brigade was
threatening that spot. Hancock immediately ordered the lst Minnesota to attack
and attack they did. With bayonets drawn, they hurled themselves down at the
Rebels, forcing them to withdraw. This left only one Confederate Brigade on the
field, that of Ambrose Wright. When they attempted to gain the crest of
Cemetery Ridge, they found their advancement blocked by newly arrived Federal
troops.
Two other Confederate Brigades under William Mahone and Dorsey Pender failed to
advance and Lee's opportunity at Cemetery Ridge came to an end at 8 p.m.
General Ewell and his troops had been ordered to pin down the Federal forces on
Culp's and Cemetery Hill and keep them from going to the aid of the other units
under attack. All day long, his Divisions sat and waited for the word from him
to attack. The Federals in the meantime had the whole day to fortify their
positions. For some unknown reason, Ewell had not heard the opening shots of
Longstreet's attack and when he did finally hear it, instead of moving forward
with Infantry, Ewell chose to fire Artillery shells at Culp's Hill and Cemetery
Ridge for the next two hours.
When at last he had decided to launch his attack, it was just about sunset and
he had failed in his orders of pining down the Federals, for almost half of the
units on Cemetery Ridge had left to reinforce the line from the Peach Orchard
to Devil's Den.
One of his Brigades was to strike Culp's Hill and the two remaining Brigades
would attack Cemetery Ridge from different directions. What happened next was
no different than what had happened continuously throughout the day...Federal
reinforcements would arrive just in time to fill the gaps and in doing so, they
would check the advancement of the oncoming enemy and hold their positions. By
10:30 p.m. all was quiet and the Confederates were pulling back. A short while
later, General Meade called a meeting with his commanding Generals. The general
consensus was to stay and fight and as the meeting closed, Meade predicted that
if Lee were to attack on the next day, that it would be on the center of the
Federal line. At that time, he didn't realize just how prophetic that statement
would be.
So ends the story of the 2nd Day of Gettysburg.
Some of the sources I used in putting this together were:
1. Time Life Series: The Civil War, "Gettysburg."
2. "High Tide at Gettysburg by Glenn Tucker.
3. "Gettysburg: A Journey in Time," by William A. Frassanito.
4. "They Met at Gettysburg," by General Edward J. Stackpole.
Also used were several of the Morningside Publications of their "Gettysburg"
magazine.
This ends The Second Day at Gettysburg.